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Mitre
Alias
Operation �office Monkeys�, Operation �ghost�, Grizzly Steppe, Iron Ritual, Cloaked Ursa, Silverfish, Minidionis, Atk7, Bluebravo, Cozy Bear, Itg11, Stellarparticle, G0016, Operation �stellarparticle�, Ta421, Midnight Blizzard, Blue Kitsune, Atk 7, Apt 29, The Dukes, Group 100, Apt29, Yttrium, Seaduke, Cloudlook, Solarstorm, Dark Halo, Nobelium, Iron Hemlock, Unc2452
Country
Russia
Sponsor
Russian Federation. State-sponsored, State-sponsored
Motivation
Information Theft And Espionage
First Seen
2008
Description
(F-Secure) The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making.
The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States; Asian, African, and Middle Eastern governments; organizations associated with Chechen extremism; and Russian speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs.
The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have engaged in apparently biannual large-scale spear-phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations.
These campaigns utilize a smash-and-grab approach involving a fast but noisy break-in followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible. If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long-term intelligence gathering.
In addition to these large-scale campaigns, the Dukes continuously and concurrently engage in smaller, much more targeted campaigns, utilizing different toolsets. These targeted campaigns have been going on for at least 7 years. The targets and timing of these campaigns appear to align with the known foreign and security policy interests of the Russian Federation at those times.
Targeted
Industries
Government, Aerospace, Defense, Energy, Law Enforcement, Financial, Pharmaceutical, Private Sector, Education, Media, Ngos, Telecommunications, Healthcare, Imagery, Think Tanks, Transportation
Targeted
Countries
Canada, Chechnya, Denmark, Slovakia, Italy, Turkey, Czech, France, Poland, Kazakhstan, Cyprus, Hungary, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ukraine, China, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Russia, Germany, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan, Chile, Israel, Brazil, Romania, Latvia, Netherlands, Montenegro, Uae, Usa, Lithuania, Uk, United States, Japan, Nato, India, Uganda, Belgium, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Mexico, Australia, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Slovenia, Singapore, Spain, South Korea, Georgia, Portugal
Tools
Miniduke
Sunspot
Tomiris
Mimikatz
Cobalt
Trailblazer
Living
Pinchduke
Rubeus
Goldmax
Powerduke
7-zip
Beatdrop
Raindrop
Sharpview
Wellmail
Teardrop
Sharp-smbexec
Sibot
Cobalt Strike
Geminiduke
Ceeloader
Supernova
Foggyweb
Regduke
Wellmess
Adfind
Liteduke
Polyglotduke
Living Off The Land
Sorefang
Goldfinder
Cozyduke
Hammerduke
Seaduke
Atnow
Fatduke
Meek
Envyscout
Graphicalneutrino
Bloodhound
Ati-agent
Magicweb
Onionduke
Sunburst
Poshspy
Cosmicduke
Cloudduke
TTP
T1195.002
T1550.001
T1059.006
T1090.003
T1583
T1573
T1053
T1036
T1556
T1090
T1098.003
T1082
T1021
T1589
T1016
T1606
T1036.004
T1568
T1548.002
T1606.001
T1059.003
T1087.002
T1566.001
T1546.008
T1102
T1218.011
T1204.001
T1059.005
T1110
T1562.002
T1078
T1547
T1078.004
T1069.002
T1001.002
T1053.005
T1070
T1550
T1213.003
T1562.001
T1133
T1070.006
T1583.006
T1098.002
T1505
T1562.004
T1621
T1566.003
T1074.002
T1021.006
T1090.001
T1558.003
T1562
T1204
T1078.003
T1027
T1546
T1071
T1102.002
T1584.001
T1190
T1114.002
T1136
T1069
T1213
T1547.001
T1005
T1199
T1114
T1095
T1550.004
T1566.002
T1018
T1595
T1560.001
T1589.001
T1048.002
T1068
T1606.002
T1218
T1016.001
T1649
T1586.002
T1090.004
T1552
T1552.004
T1001
T1560
T1484.002
T1071.001
T1140
T1027.006
T1059
T1553.002
T1021.002
T1087.004
T1587
T1556.007
T1482
T1588.002
T1027.001
T1098
T1195
T1218.005
T1558
T1539
T1587.001
T1204.002
T1003
T1550.003
T1136.003
T1098.001
T1555.003
T1546.003
T1047
T1074
T1078.002
T1548
T1059.001
T1587.003
T1070.008
T1505.003
T1203
T1083
T1048
T1070.004
T1057
T1584
T1003.006
T1555
T1583.001
T1588
T1105
T1087
T1595.002
T1586
T1553.005
T1098.005
T1484
T1027.002
T1553
T1566
T1021.001
T1110.003
T1036.005
Operations
Performed
[2013-02] since The Original Announcement, We Have Observed Several New Attacks Using The Same Exploit (cve-2013-0640) Which Drop Other Malware. Between These, We�ve Observed A Couple Of Incidents Which Are So Unusual In Many Ways That We-ve Decided To Analyse Them In Depth. (https://securelist.com/the-miniduke-mystery-pdf-0-day-government-spy-assembler-0x29a-micro-backdoor/31112/)
[2013] while The Old Style Miniduke Implants Were Used To Target Mostly Government Victims, The New Style Cosmicduke Implants Have A Somehow Different Typology Of Victims. The Most Unusual Is The Targeting Of Individuals That Appear To Be Involved In The Traffic And Reselling Of Controlled And Illegal Substances, Such As Steroids And Hormones. These Victims In The Nitro Project Have Been Observed Only In Russia. (https://securelist.com/miniduke-is-back-nemesis-gemina-and-the-botgen-studio/64107/)
[2013] operation �ghost� (we Call These Newly Uncovered Dukes Campaigns, Collectively, Operation Ghost, And Describe How The Group Has Been Busy Compromising Government Targets, Including Three European Ministries Of Foreign Affairs And The Washington Dc Embassy Of A European Union Country, All Without Drawing Attention To Their Activities. (https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/eset_operation_ghost_dukes.pdf)
[2014-03] operation �office Monkeys� (in March 2014, A Washington, D.c.-based Private Research Institute Was Found To Have Cozyduke (trojan.cozer) On Their Network. Cozy Bear Then Started An Email Campaign Attempting To Lure Victims Into Clicking On A Flash Video Of Office Monkeys That Would Also Include Malicious Executables. By July The Group Had Compromised Government Networks And Directed Cozyduke-infected Systems To Install Miniduke Onto A Compromised Network. (https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory)
[2015-08] attack On The Pentagon In The Usa (in August 2015 Cozy Bear Was Linked To A Spear-phishing Cyberattack Against The Pentagon Email System Causing The Shutdown Of The Entire Joint Staff Unclassified Email System And Internet Access During The Investigation. (https://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/06/russia-hacks-pentagon-computers-nbc-citing-sources.html)
[2016-06] breach Of Democratic National Committee (in June 2016, Cozy Bear Was Implicated Alongside The Hacker Group sofacy, Apt 28, Fancy Bear, Sednit Had Only Been There A Few Weeks. Cozy Bear�s More Sophisticated Tradecraft And Interest In Traditional Long-term Espionage Suggest That The Group Originates From A Separate Russian Intelligence Agency. (https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/)
[2016-08] attacks On Us Think Tanks And Ngos (after The United States Presidential Election, 2016, Cozy Bear Was Linked To A Series Of Coordinated And Well-planned Spear-phishing Campaigns Against U.s.-based Think Tanks And Non-governmental Organizations (ngos). (https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/)
[2017-01] attacks On The Norwegian Government (on February 3, 2017, The Norwegian Police Security Service (pst) Reported That Attempts Had Been Made To Spear-phish The Email Accounts Of Nine Individuals In The Ministry Of Defense, Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, And The Labour Party. The Acts Were Attributed To Cozy Bear, Whose Targets Included The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Pst Section Chief Arne Christian Haugst�yl, And An Unnamed College. (https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/02/03/norway-russian-hackers-hit-spy-agency-defense-labour-party/97441782/)
[2017-02] attack On Dutch Ministries (in February 2017, The General Intelligence And Security Service (aivd) Of The Netherlands Revealed That Fancy Bear And Cozy Bear Had Made Several Attempts To Hack Into Dutch Ministries, Including The Ministry Of General Affairs, Over The Previous Six Months. Rob Bertholee, Head Of The Aivd, Said On Eenvandaag That The Hackers Were Russian And Had Tried To Gain Access To Secret Government Documents. (https://www.volkskrant.nl/cultuur-media/russen-faalden-bij-hackpogingen-ambtenaren-op-nederlandse-ministeries, B77ff391/)
[2017-09] russian Hackers Breached Dutch Police Systems In 2017 (https://therecord.media/russian-hackers-breached-dutch-police-systems-in-2017/)
[2018-11] phishing Campaign In The Usa (target: Multiple Industries, Including Think Tank, Law Enforcement, Media, U.s. Military, Imagery, Transportation, Pharmaceutical, National Government, And Defense Contracting. (method: Phishing Email Appearing To Be From The U.s. Department Of State With Links To Zip Files Containing Malicious Windows Shortcuts That Delivered Cobalt Strike Beacon. (https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html)
[2019-08] solarwinds Orion Supply-chain Attack (https://www.dropbox.com/s/yu5uwsfyo9q4oj2/whitepaper%20solarwinds%20orion%20supply-chain%20attack.pdf?dl=0)
[2020] throughout 2020, Apt29 Has Targeted Various Organisations Involved In Covid-19 Vaccine Development In Canada, The United States And The United Kingdom, Highly Likely With The Intention Of Stealing Information And Intellectual Property Relating To The Development And Testing Of Covid-19 Vaccines. (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/advisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development.pdf)
[2020] suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government And Business Entities Around The Globe (https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business)
[2021] operation �stellarparticle� (early Bird Catches The Wormhole: Observations From The Stellarparticle Campaign (https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/)
[2021-02] russian Cyberspies Targeted The Slovak Government For Months (https://therecord.media/russian-cyberspies-targeted-slovak-government-for-months/)
[2021-02] france Warns Of Nobelium Cyberspies Attacking French Orgs (https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/france-warns-of-nobelium-cyberspies-attacking-french-orgs/)
[2021 Early] trello From The Other Side: Tracking Apt29 Phishing Campaigns (https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-apt29-phishing-campaigns)
[2021-04] foggyweb: Targeted Nobelium Malware Leads To Persistent Backdoor (https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/)
[2021-05] suspected Apt29 Operation Launches Election Fraud Themed Phishing Campaigns (https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/05/27/suspected-apt29-operation-launches-election-fraud-themed-phishing-campaigns/)
[2021-06] new Nobelium Activity (https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/)
[2021 Mid] solardeflection C2 Infrastructure Used By Nobelium In Company Brand Misuse (https://www.recordedfuture.com/solardeflection-c2-infrastructure-used-by-nobelium-in-company-brand-misuse/)
[2021-06] bear Tracks: Infrastructure Patterns Lead To More Than 30 Active Apt29 C2 Servers (https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/apt29-bear-tracks/)
[2021-07] russia �cozy Bear� Breached Gop As Ransomware Attack Hit (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-06/russian-state-hackers-breached-republican-national-committee)
[2021-07] new Activity From Russian Actor Nobelium (https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/10/24/new-activity-from-russian-actor-nobelium/)
[2021-07] solarwind Attackers At It Again In Back-to-back Campaigns (https://cybersecurityworks.com/blog/vulnerabilities/solarwind-attackers-at-it-again-in-back-to-back-campaigns.html>)
[2021-07] in Recent Months, The Dukes Launched Several Spearphishing Campaigns Targeting European Diplomats, Think Tanks And International Organizations. Eset Researchers Identified Victims In More Than 12 Different European Countries. (https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/eset_threat_report_t22021.pdf)
[2021-10] in October And November 2021, Eset Detected Additional Spearphishing Campaigns, Again Targeting European Diplomatic Missions And Ministries Of Foreign Affairs. (https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/eset_threat_report_t32021.pdf)
[2022-02] nobelium Returns To The Political World Stage (https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/nobelium-returns-to-the-political-world-stage)
[2022-05] russian Apt29 Hackers Use Online Storage Services, Dropbox And Google Drive (https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cloaked-ursa-online-storage-services-campaigns/)
[2022-08] you Can�t Audit Me: Apt29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365 (https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft)
[2022-08] magicweb: Nobelium�s Post-compromise Trick To Authenticate As Anyone (https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/)
[2022-10] bluebravo Uses Ambassador Lure To Deploy Graphicalneutrino Malware (https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2023-0127.pdf)
[2023-03] "nobelium Uses Polands Ambassador�s Visit To The U.s. To Target Eu Governments Assisting Ukraine (https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/03/nobelium-targets-eu-governments-assisting-ukraine"
Counter
Operations
'date': '2014-08', 'activity': 'dutch Agencies Provide Crucial Intel About Russia�s Interference In Us-elections (https://www.volkskrant.nl/wetenschap/dutch-agencies-provide-crucial-intel-about-russia-s-interference-in-us-elections, B4f8111b/', 'date': '2018-07', 'activity': 'mueller Indicts 12 Russians For Dnc Hacking As Trump-putin Summit Looms (https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/13/mueller-indicts-12-russians-for-hacking-into-dnc-718805', 'date': '2021-04', 'activity': 'executive Order On Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities Of The Government Of The Russian Federation (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/ (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/04/15/executive-order-on-blocking-property-with-respect-to-specified-harmful-foreign-activities-of-the-government-of-the-russian-federation/ (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/a-letter-on-blocking-property-with-respect-to-specified-harmful-foreign-activities-of-the-government-of-the-russian-federation/', 'date': '2021-06', 'activity': 'justice Department Announces Court-authorized Seizure Of Domain Names Used In Furtherance Of Spear-phishing Campaign Posing As U.s. Agency For International Development (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-seizure-domain-names-used-furtherance-spear'
Information
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/17/operation-ghost-dukes-never-left/
https://www.carbonblack.com/2020/03/26/the-dukes-of-moscow/
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AR-17-20045_Enhanced_Analysis_of_GRIZZLY_STEPPE_Activity.pdf
https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/threat-group/guid:6acdb86af596b31ca8d273eb5572904f
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cozy_Bear
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_Fact_Sheet-Russian_SVR_Activities_Related_to_SolarWinds_Compromise_508C.pdf
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory%20Further%20TTPs%20associated%20with%20SVR%20cyber%20actors.pdf
https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2452-merged-into-apt29
https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prodaft/malware-ioc/master/SilverFish/SilverFish_TLPWHITE.pdf
https://download.microsoft.com/download/4/6/5/4650b04f-7db6-4a87-bf82-8ed1ad1c001c/MS%20Security%20Experts%20Cyberattack%20MagicWeb%202023.pdf
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